In determining the issue, the Court was guided by provisions of the Arbitration Act. When the tribunal notified the parties that a signed copy of the award was ready for collection, the date of notification was deemed to be the date of delivery and receipt of the award because it was on that date that the tribunal made the signed copy available for collection by the parties. Once the arbitral tribunal notified the parties that the award was ready for collection upon payment of fees and expenses, then delivery had happened as it is upon the parties to pay the fees and expenses. That was because the only obligation of the arbitral tribunal was to avail a signed copy of the award. The tribunal having discharged that obligation meant that delivery and receipt of the signed copy of the award was deemed because any delay in actual collection could only be blamed on the parties. The contention that the applicant was late in collecting the award because of difficulties in raising its share or tribunal fees and expenses could have been made in an application for extension of time, for the making of the application to set aside the award. However, there was a school of thought stating that there were no specific provisions for expansion of time under section 35(3) of the Arbitration Act and therefore the timelines were cast in stone and could not be expanded.
A notice to the parties that an award is ready for collection is both sufficient delivery and receipt of the award to the parties. Once the arbitral tribunal notifies the parties that the award is ready for collection upon payment of fees and expenses, then delivery is deemed to have happened as it is upon the parties to pay the fees and expenses.